

**SECRET**

42-2

OPTIONAL  
5010-104

Approved For Release 2004/12/16 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200090010-9

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO :

DATE: 3 August 1965

FROM :

SUBJECT: Memo for the Record

1. This memorandum discusses the data on logistic requirements for the Viet Cong (VC) and Peoples Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) forces in South Vietnam (SVN) used in ORR Project 31.4561 (S-1570) Analysis of the Problems of Foreign Logistic Support to the Communist Main Force in South Vietnam.

25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

2. The figures for logistic requirements used in the original draft of the ORR report were obtained from DIA whose responsibility it is to make such estimates for the intelligence community. A summary statement of the logistics requirements was first obtained from DIA by [ ] who visited DIA and made notes on a report prepared by DIA for the JCS.\* T/TR was informed that the report could not be handed to the branch until its release was approved by the JCS. After [ ] made a trip to DIA to discuss certain details of the estimates in the DIA report, a first draft of ORR Project 31.4561 was written based on the data obtained from DIA, but with some reductions in the requirements for certain classes of supplies. It was obvious in the first draft that the daily resupply requirement for 1 PAVN division (9 combat battalions) was much higher than for 40 VC battalions, even though both groups were equipped with the same arms and fighting at the same level of combat. After reading the first draft Chief ERA stated that it was his belief, based on other reports, that the food for the PAVN division was obtained locally, so the report was rewritten eliminating the DIA estimate for the requirement for food. This substantially reduced the difference between the requirements for the VC and PAVN. In the meantime DIA had reviewed a draft of the T/TR report and a conference was held with DIA with [ ] attending. At this time differences in the DIA and CIA reports were discussed and a copy of the DIA report for the JCS was

\* The Viet Cong Logistic System and DRV Logistic Support Requirements for the Viet Cong Under Various Operational Conditions, (Undated). S.

DIA review(s) completed.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2004/12/16 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200090010-9

given to T/TR, even though it still had not been approved for release. The conference with DIA and an examination of its report revealed that because details had been lacking earlier there was a considerable difference between the interpretation of the DIA figures for the VC requirements as used in the CIA draft and the estimates given in the typed DIA report. The CIA report was then rewritten and these figures reduced the VC requirements considerably so that the VC requirements were again much lower relative to the PAVN requirements. The relative difference between the two requirements raised the question of the accuracy of the DIA estimates. The DIA report shows in considerable detail how the estimates for the VC requirements were obtained, but does not show how the requirements for the PAVN division were obtained. The DIA report gives the requirements for the VC and PAVN units as shown below.

DIA Estimates of Current Daily  
Resupply Requirements - Tons per Day

	<u>All VC (64,000 Men or 121 Battalions)</u>	<u>PAVN Division (4,770 Men or 9 Combat Battalions)</u>
Class I - Food	5.01*	5.31
Class II & IV - (Except Weapons)	0.27	2.70
Class III - POL	Negl.	1.25
Class II - (Weapons Only)	1.07	-
Class V - Ammo	1.89	2.70
Totals	<u>8.24</u>	<u>11.96</u>

3. The difference between the requirements for the two units become even more noticeable when computed on a battalion basis:

Current Daily Resupply Requirements  
Per Battalion Based on DIA Estimates

	<u>VC</u>	<u>PAVN</u>	<u>No. of Times PAVN Greater Than VC</u>
Class I	.0414*	.59	14
Class II & IV - (Except Weapons)	.0022	.90	410
Class III	Negl	.14	-
Class II - (Weapons Only)	.0088	-	-
Class V - Ammo	.0156	.90	60
Totals	<u>.0680</u>	<u>2.53</u>	<u>37</u>

\* Food for porters and infiltrators only, not for VC fighting units.

**SECRET**

(The difference at higher levels of combat are not relatively as great, although they are still large.)

25X1

4. In view of these large differences T/TR contacted DIA by telephone on 28 July 1965 to ask if the relatively large requirement for the PAVN division could be explained. DIA said that the only man who could explain it was on leave and would not be back for 5 days. Due to the urgency of the request for the CIA report a conference was held, attended by Director, ORR; Chief, ERA; Chief, D/T, [REDACTED] T/TR, and two representatives from ONE on 29 July 1965, to discuss the problem of the difference in requirements between the VC and PAVN units. At this meeting it was agreed to make requirements for PAVN battalions equal to the requirements for a VC battalion plus 20 percent additional. The final draft has been recomputed using this assumption.

25X1



- 3 -

**SECRET**